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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court subsequently assigned this case 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4), by order 
dated May 6, 2009. The Utah Court of Appeals now has jurisdiction of this case pursuant 
to the Utah Supreme Court's assignment and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
However, this Court only has jurisdiction to review the trial court's granting of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the 
trial court's denial of Plaintiff s three post-judgment motions due to Plaitniffs' failure to 
file an amended notice of appeal pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2). This Court denied 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Disposition and deferred ruling on such motion 
"pending full briefing and plenary presentation and consideration of the case." This 
Court should now address the jurisdictional issue raised in Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Disposition. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court err in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment? 
a. Standard of Review: Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Summary judgments present for review 
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conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not 
resolve factual issues. Thus, [this Court] accord[s] no deference to the trial 
court, but review[s] its conclusions for correctness." McNair v. Farris, 944 
P.2d 392, 394 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Did Plaintiffs' failure to file an amended notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 
4(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure prevent this Court from 
exercising jurisdiction over denial of Plaintiffs' three post-judgment motions? 
a. Standard of Review: "The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question 
of law that [this Court] review[s] for correctness. Brown v. Glover, 2000 
UT 89,U 15, 16P.3d540. 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' motion to alter or 
amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? 
a. Standard of Review: "'A motion or action to modify a final judgment is 
addressed to the discretion of the trial court, the exercise of which must be 
based on sound legal principles in light of all relevant circumstances.' That 
court's determination will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of 
discretion." Gillmorv. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993) (quoting 
Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982)). 
Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs' motion to conform the pleadings 
to the evidence pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
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a. Standard of Review: Rule 15(b) allows for mandatory and permissive 
amendment of pleadings. Under the mandatory prong, the trial court must 
allow a party to amend a pleading if the parties tried an extraneous issue by 
express or implied consent. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Braham Fin., Inc., 1999 
UT 13,18, 974 P.2d 288. "A court's conclusion that parties tried an issue 
by express or implied consent is a legal question, which [this Court] 
reviewfs] for correctness." Id. "However, 'because the trial court's 
determination of whether the issues were tried with all parties' implied 
consent is highly fact intensive, [this Court] grant[s] the trial court a fairly 
broad measure of discretion in making that determination under a given set 
of facts." Id. "Under the permissive prong of the Rule 15(b) analysis, [this 
Court] will reverse the trial court's denial of a motion to amend only where 
there is 'no reasonable basis' for its decision." Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 
2007 UT App 243, ^  40, 166 P.3d 169 (quoting England v. Horbach, 944 
P.2d 340, 345 (Utah 1997)). 
V. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' motion for leave 
to amend their complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? 
a. Standard of Review: This Court can overturn a trial court's denial of a 
motion to amend a complaint only where the trial court has abused its 
discretion. Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, f 14, 87 
P.3d 734. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b) (2001) 
(9)(b) For new policies written on or after January J, 2001, 
the limits of underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to 
the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability 
coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage 
limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor 
vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a 
lesser amount by signing an acknowledgement form provided 
by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured 
motorist coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to 
purchase underinsured motorist coverage with limits equal 
to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle 
liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer under the 
insured's motor vehicle policy. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(2) 
A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of 
judgment, but before entry of an order disposing of any 
motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry 
of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice 
of appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying 
judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any 
motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal 
or an amended notice of appeal within the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading 
is served or, if the pleadings is one to which no responsive 
pleadings in permitted and the action has not been placed 
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time 
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within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may 
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires.... 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not 
raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects 
as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to 
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these 
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not 
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is 
objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within 
the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission 
of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a 
continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to 
meet such evidence. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter 
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days 
after entry of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of Plaintiffs' claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits 
above the amounts set forth in their auto insurance policy. Plaintiffs claim that 
Defendant failed to provide them with sufficient underinsured motorist coverage and 
have raised claims for breach of contract, insurance bad faith, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress based on that alleged 
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failure. Based on the allegations and claims articulated in their Complaint, the trial court 
granted Defendant summary judgment and subsequently denied Plaintiffs' three post-
judgment motions. Plaintiffs now appeal the trial court's rulings. 
Facts 
Plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident on or about March 18, 2006, 
in which they allegedly received injuries which exceeded the at-fault party's liability 
insurance limits. (R. at 3, ^ [ 9.) When they made a claim for underinsured motorist 
benefits with Defendant, Plaintiffs were notified that they had UIM coverage of 
$10,000/$20,000. (R. at 4, % 12; 411.) Dissatisfied, Plaintiffs filed suit against 
Defendant. (R. at 1.) Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges, in pertinent part, that Defendant 
failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b) (R. at 2, Tf 9) and that 
Defendant violated "Utah law," claiming that Defendant should have paid them UIM 
benefits in an amount in excess of the limits than stated in their insurance policy and 
more than that purchased by the premiums paid. (R. at 4-5.) 
Procedural Details of the Case 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendant on or about October 18, 2006. 
(R. at 1-18.) After the end of fact discovery, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs could not prevail on their claims as stated in their 
Complaint. (R. at 419-20.) After briefing by both parties and oral arguments, the trial 
court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in a Memorandum Decision 
dated January 9, 2009. (R. at 715-22.) The Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was entered on or about February 11, 2009. (R. at 800-03.) Plaintiffs then 
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filed three post-judgment motions under Rules 59(e), 15(b), and 15(a), seeking 
amendment of the Judgment, an order conforming the pleadings to the evidence, and 
leave to amend their Complaint, respectively. (R. at 765-68.) After briefing by both 
parties and oral arguments, the trial court denied each of the three post-judgment 
motions. (R. at 846-51.) Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on April 30,2009 (R. at 
858-60), before the trial court entered the Order denying the three post-judgment motions 
on May 8, 2009 (R. at 865-68.) Subsequently, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary 
Disposition, claiming that Plaintiffs had failed to comply with Rule 4(b)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The parties are now in the process of finishing briefing on 
Plaintiffs' appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
Defendant moved for summary judgment because undisputed facts failed to 
support the claims identified in Plaintiffs5 Complaint. (R. at 356-420.) A review of the 
Complaint reveals that Plaintiffs based all four of their causes of action on two 
allegations: (a) Defendant violated Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b); and (b) 
Defendant violated "Utah law." (R. at 2, 4-5.) In their Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs conceded that Defendant had not violated Utah 
Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b). (R. at 434, 720.) This left the trial court with only one 
remaining issue—whether Plaintiffs' allegation that Defendant violated "Utah law" was 
sufficient to provide notice to Defendant of the basis for their claims. Appropriately, the 
trial court ruled that Plaintiffs' Complaint did not provide sufficient notice to Defendant 
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of the basis for their claims, even under Utah's liberal pleading standard. (R. at 721.) 
The trial court relied on this Court's ruling in Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 
2008 UT App 315, 193 P.3d 650, for support of its conclusion that Plaintiffs had failed to 
provide the requisite minimum notice. (R. at 720.) The trial court correctly granted 
Defendant summary judgment based on the evidence and the claims identified in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
II 
Plaintiffs failed to preserve their appeal of the trial court's denial of their three 
post-judgment motions, preventing this Court from exercising jurisdiction. Plaintiffs 
filed their notice of appeal in this case after entry of the Order granting Defendant 
summary judgment, but before the trial court entered an order disposing of Plaintiffs' 
three post-judgment motions. Under Rule 4(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal was valid as it pertained to review of the 
underlying grant of summary judgment. However, this Rule also requires Plaintiffs to 
file an amended notice of appeal if they wanted to preserve their appeal of the trial 
court's denial of their three post-judgment motions. Plaintiffs failed to file an amended 
notice of appeal, thereby preventing this Court from exercising jurisdiction over these 
post-judgment motions. 
in 
The trial court is given broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion 
to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
this case, the trial court correctly denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the 
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Judgment for several reasons. First, the trial court noted that Plaintiffs were attempting to 
raise a new argument which had not been previously mentioned in their Complaint. (R. 
at 866.) Second, Plaintiffs failed to distinguish the Asael case or otherwise show its 
inapplicability to the present case. (Id.) Third, Plaintiffs' new argument was directly 
contrary to the argument made in their Complaint, i.e. that Plaintiffs had a "new" policy 
requiring Defendant to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b). (Id.) Fourth, 
Plaintiffs had not even made an attempt, prior to the grant of summary judgment, to seek 
leave to amend their Complaint to include their new argument. (R. at 867.) Fifth, 
Plaintiffs were attempting to contravene the trial court's case management order by 
attempting to raise new claims after all discovery deadlines had passed, and after they 
realized that their claims failed as a matter of law. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiffs raised a new 
argument in their Rule 59(e) motion that they had not made during the summary 
judgment proceeding, specifically claiming that they had made an error in citing to the 
wrong statute in their Complaint. Based on these reasons, the trial court correctly denied 
Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. 
IV 
This Court should uphold the denial of Plaintiffs' claim for relief under Rule 15(b) 
for several reasons. First, the relatively recent decisions of Utah's appellate courts 
support the conclusion that Rule 15(b) does not even apply in a summary judgment 
setting. Second, the trial court properly denied Plaintiffs' Rule 15(b) motion to conform 
the pleadings to the evidence because such relief could be granted only if the trial court 
allowed alteration or amendment of the judgment under Rule 59(e), which it did not do. 
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Additionally, Plaintiffs provided no factual or legal support for their claim for relief 
under Rule 15(b). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Plaintiffs' Rule 15(b) 
motion. 
V 
As with Rule 15(b), the trial court properly exercised its broad discretion in 
denying Plaintiffs' Rule 15(a) motion for leave to amend their complaint. First, because 
the trial court denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend, the trial court could not even 
consider granting this motion for leave to amend. Second, Plaintiffs' motion for leave 
was untimely. Third, Plaintiffs failed to establish entitlement to relief under Rule 15(a) 
due to their failure to meet the criteria required for such relief. Therefore, the trial court 
properly exercised its broad discretion in denying Plaintiffs Rule 15(a) motion. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Summary judgments present for 
review conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not 
resolve factual issues. Thus, [this Court] accord[s] no deference to the trial court, but 
review[s] its conclusions for correctness." McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392, 394 (Utah Ct. 
10 
App. 1997). Based on this standard of review, this Court should conclude that the trial 
court properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Granted Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment based on the allegations in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and the undisputed facts. Specifically, Defendant argued that 
Plaintiffs failed, as a matter of law, to establish their four causes of action for breach of 
contract, insurance bad faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. (R. at 360.) Each of these four causes of action rests 
solely on the following allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint: 
4. On March 18, 2006, plaintiffs were insured by 
defendant under an automobile insurance policy which 
was issued by defendant after January 1, 2001. 
6. Pursuant to § 31A-22-305(9)(b)9 Utah Code 
Annotated, the limits of underinsured motorist 
coverage required to be provided to plaintiffs was an 
amount equal to the lesser of the limits of their liability 
coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer under the 
insured's automobile insurance policy, unless the 
insured purchased coverage in a lesser amount by 
signing an acknowledgement form meeting the certain 
statutory requirements. 
7. This provision was considered part of the plaintiffs' 
insurance policy. 
12. In violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts, 
defendant advised Plaintiffs that their policy of 
insurance only provided underinsured motorist 
n 
coverage in the amount of $10,000, up to $20,000, per 
occurrence. 
15. The defendant has refused to pay the limits of 
underinsured motorist coverage required by the policy 
and by law. 
16. The defendant's refusal to pay the limits of 
underinsured motorist coverage required by the policy 
and by law constitutes a breach of the parties' contract 
of insurance.. 
(R. at 2, 4-5 (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs based each of their four causes of action on 
two arguments: (a) Defendant failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
305(9)(b); and (b) Defendant violated "Utah law." Given the clear and unequivocal 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b), the trial court acknowledged that this 
statute only applied to "new policies written on or after January 1, 2001." (R. at 720 
(emphasis added).) However, Plaintiffs had been insured with Defendant since 1966. (R. 
at 357, Tf 3; Appellant's Br. at 9.) 
In addressing these two issues, the trial court noted that Plaintiffs had conceded in 
their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment "that their policy 
would likely be considered as an existing policy, rather than a new policy.. . ." (R. at 
434, 720.) In light of Plaintiffs' admission that Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b) did 
not apply to their claim as alleged in their Complaint, the trial court was left only to 
determine whether Plaintiffs' allegations that Defendant had violated "Utah law" satisfied 
Utah's notice pleading standard, warranting denial of summary judgment. 
In addressing this last issue, Plaintiffs raised for the first time their argument that 
Defendant had violated a different part of the UIM statute, i.e., Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
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22-305(9)(g), which applies only to "existing" policies.1 (R. at 443-48.) Plaintiffs 
argued that the reference in their Complaint that Defendant had violated "Utah law" 
complied with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(e)(1) in that it was "simple, concise 
and direct," and that such allegation should be liberally construed as required by Rule 
1(a), purportedly allowing them to raise this new argument related to subsection "g." (R. 
at 444.) In response to this new argument, which Plaintiffs raised for the first time in 
their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiffs' 
"existing" policy, Defendant refused to consider, let alone argue, the merits of such a new 
claim, and urged the trial court to do the same. (Ex. " 1 , " at 2-8.) 
It is well settled that "a plaintiff is required, under [Utah's] liberal pleading 
standard of notice pleading, to submit a 'short and plain statement... showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief and 'a demand for judgment for the relief.'" Canfield v. 
Layton City, 2005 UT 60, f 14, 122 P.3d 622 (omission in original) (quoting Utah R. Civ. 
P. 8(a)(l)-(2)). In addition, "[t]he plaintiff must only give the defendant 'fair notice of 
the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of 
litigation involved.'" Id. (citation omitted). However, "it must do at least that much'' 
AsaelFarr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 2008 UT App 315, f 17, 193 P.3d 650 
(emphasis added) (citing Harper v. Evans, 2008 UT App 165, f 13, 185 P.3d 573). Here, 
Plaintiffs have not done "at least that much." 
1
 Although Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment refers to their new claim as 
arising under Subsection "h," this particular subsection was renumbered from its original designation as subsection 
"g." Therefore, for the purpose of continuity, Appellee's Brief will use the subsection "g" designation to refer to the 
part of the statute which applies to "existing" policies. 
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In this case, this Court must answer one central question: Is there any allegation in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint that could possibly lead the trial court, or any reasonable person for 
that matter, to conclude that Plaintiffs intended to argue or claim that they had an 
"existing" policy and that Defendant failed to comply with any statutory requirements 
related to such an existing policy? The answer is "no." In fact, Plaintiffs' Complaint not 
only cited subsection (b) only, not (g), but it also contained a two substantive claims that 
were pertinent only under subsection (b). Those allegations were that Plaintiffs' policy 
was issued by Defendant after January 1, 2001 (R. at 2, f^ 4) and that Plaintiffs never 
signed a UIM acknowledgement form (R. at 3, J^ 8). Subsection (g) did not require 
existing insureds to sign an acknowledgement form. Simply alleging that a party has 
violated "Utah law" does not provide the minimum notice requirements spoken of by the 
Canfield and Asael courts. Thus, by definition, Plaintiffs have not complied with Utah's 
pleading standard sufficient to provide notice to Defendant of the nature and basis of their 
new claim. The trial court agreed with the reasoning in Asael in granting Defendant 
summary judgment. (R. at 720.) 
Despite the clear lack of notice, Plaintiffs insist that a simple reference to "Utah 
law" satisfies Utah's liberal pleading standard. Specifically, Plaintiffs state that if they 
had "left out the statutory reference in paragraph 6 of their complaint entirely (the only 
reference to subsection (b)), their complaint would still have stated a claim against 
[Defendant]." (Appellants' Br. at 29-30.) Plaintiffs also state that their Complaint would 
have provided sufficient notice even if the statutory reference to subsection "b" and the 
reference to when the policy began had been omitted. (Appellants' Br. at 44.) Plaintiffs 
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rely on this argument based on their contention that simply alleging that Defendant owed 
Plaintiffs an amount of underinsured motorist coverage equal to their liability limits 
satisfies their notice requirements. (Appellants' Br. at 27.) If this Court accepted 
Plaintiffs' argument, then Defendant could also have been theoretically on notice of a 
myriad of other potential claims. For example, Defendant could have been potentially 
liable for higher UIM limits based on theories of equitable estoppel, fraud, 
misrepresentation, reformation, or detrimental reliance, to name a few. But, like 
Plaintiffs' claim arising under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(g), Defendant had no 
notice of any of these other potential theories of liability because nothing in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint even suggested these legal theories. In fact, the substantive allegations of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint regarding the lack of a signed acknowledgement show a clear intent 
to rely on subsection (b). 
In sum, the trial court did not commit any error in granting Defendant summary 
judgment in light of Plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead any claim related to their new 
argument under subsection "g." 
B. The Trial Court's Ruling is Consistent with the Rulings of Other Utah 
Courts. 
In Asael, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether the allegations in the 
plaintiffs complaint satisfied the notice requirements stated above. The court noted: 
Nowhere in the third amended complaint, or in the three complaints that 
preceded it, does [plaintiff] allege that any of the defendants had actually 
bound adequate coverage but refused to pay the amounts due under that 
orally bound policy. Rather [plaintiffs] claims, which all arise out of its 
contention that the defendants failed to ensure that [plaintiff] was covered 
for all of its significant risks, are directly contrary to such a position. And 
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we see nothing in the complaint to suggest that [plaintiff] intended to assert 
the existence of adequate coverage as an alternative theory. Consequently, 
the third amended complaint does not give Appellees fair notice of the 
nature and basis of the oral binder theory and was therefore not properly 
before the court at the time of summary judgment. 
2008 UT App 315, %l8 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
This case reveals three important similarities to the present case. First, the court 
did not allow the plaintiff to present a claim that was "directly contrary" to its previous 
position. In the case at bar, Plaintiffs first claimed that their insurance policy was a 
"new" policy. (R. at 434.) The only other option was that such a policy constituted an 
"existing" policy, which is exactly opposite of their claim that it was "new." Second, the 
Asael court analyzed "the complaint" to see if the claim was raised as an alternate theory, 
and made no attempt to determine whether discovery had occurred on that particular 
claim or whether the opposing party had some other "notice" and opportunity to defend. 
Finally, the court held that this new issue was "not properly before the court at the time of 
summary judgment." Plaintiffs here similarly requested that the trial court consider, for 
the first time, their "existing" policy claim under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(g) "at 
the time of summary judgment," which the Utah Court of Appeals has expressly denied. 
Ultimately, the Asael court concluded as follows: 
[Plaintiffs] oral binder claim was first raised, after approximately three 
years of discovery, in Fair's memorandum in opposition to [defendant's] 
motion for summary judgment. Rejecting this tactic, the Utah Supreme 
Court explained: "A plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel 
claims or theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion 
to dismiss or for summary judgment because such amendment fails to 
satisfy Utah's pleading requirements?^ 
Id. at \ 18 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 
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UT 38, If 31, 48 P.3d 895). Plaintiffs have also failed to satisfy Utah's pleading 
requirements. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also addressed the tactics being used by Plaintiffs in 
Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook. In Holmes, the plaintiff attempted to raise new claims for 
breach of duties outside those duties imposed by the contract at issue and which plaintiff 
had not raised in its complaint. 2002 UT 38, ^ f 30. The court responded by stating that 
the "claim was originally raised in [plaintiffs] memorandum in opposition to 
[defendant's] motion to dismiss/for summary judgment, and was not raised in the 
complaint. . . . [Plaintiff's] claims must therefore be restricted to the grounds set forth in 
the complaint" Id. at ^ 31 (emphasis added). Again, the Utah Supreme Court did not 
analyze or address whether the defendant had an opportunity to engage in discovery 
related to the new claim raised for the first time or whether it had adequate notice beyond 
the notice required in the complaint. Likewise, the trial court did not allow Plaintiffs to 
raise their new "existing" policy claim when considering Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Harper v. Evans also came to the same conclusion 
reached by numerous Utah courts regarding Plaintiffs' attempt to make new claims not 
raised in their Complaint. In Harper, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant "negligently 
performed the November 2002 surgeries 'and nothing more.'" 2008 UT App 165, f 13, 
185 P.3d 573 (quoting Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, \ 11 n.9, 984 P.2d 960). However, 
plaintiff attempted to raise a new argument of defendant's negligent course of treatment 
after the surgeries. The court held that "[t]hese allegations, standing alone, do not state a 
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claim for relief for continuous negligent treatment, even under Utah's liberal notice 
pleading requirements." Harper, 2008 UT App 165, ^ [ 13. The court further explained: 
In so holding, we emphasize that we cannot rely on the allegations of a 
negligent course of treatment raised for the first time in the Harpers' 
opposition to summary judgment.... The Harpers were free to seek leave 
to amend their complaint to allege new or different causes of action, see 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), but having failed to do so they could not effectively 
raise such new claims in their opposition brief. See Holmes Dev., 2002 UT 
38, ^ 31, 48 P.3d 895 (stating that in the absence of proper amendment, 
"claims must . . . be restricted to the grounds set forth in the complaint"). 
Id. at \ 14. At the time of the summary judgment proceedings, Plaintiffs had not even 
sought to amend their complaint, presumably because Utah case law prohibited them 
from amending at this late stage in litigation, especially when all discovery deadlines had 
passed, and Defendant would be prejudiced by being required to file an answer to an 
amended complaint, re-open discovery, conduct extensive discovery on the new issue 
raised, and further delay resolution of this matter which was ready to be tried. In any 
event, this Court should not consider any claims that have not been timely and properly 
raised. 
Following the identical analysis that this Court used in Asael, and consistent with 
the decisions in Holmes and Harper, the trial court properly concluded that "Plaintiffs9 
[new] argument is directly contrary to their previous position." (R. at 720.) The trial 
court further noted that Plaintiffs "made no attempt to even suggest [the "existing" policy 
claim] as an alternate theory." (R. at 720-21.) Finally, the trial court noted that Plaintiffs 
had not made a request to amend their Complaint. (R. at 72 L) Based on the foregoing, 
the trial court properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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II. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' THREE POST-JUDGMENT 
MOTIONS.2 
It is well established under Utah law that "[fjailure to timely file an appeal 
pursuant to Rule 4 constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal. Additionally, failure to 
make a timely filing deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal." State v. 
Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, If 23, 62 P.3d 444. Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal in 
response to the trial court's Memorandum Decision denying their three post-judgment 
motions, but before the trial court entered a final order on those motions. (R. at 858-60.) 
These three post-judgment motions consisted of a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the 
judgment, a Rule 15(b) motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence, and a Rule 
15(a) motion for leave to amend Plaintiffs' Complaint. {Id.) However, this Court lacks 
the subject matter jurisdiction to review the denial of each of these three motions. 
A. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Review the Trial Court's Denial of 
Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment 
Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and have therefore prevented this Court from exercising jurisdiction over 
review of the denial of their Rule 59(e) motion. A party has thirty days "after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order to file a notice of appeal." See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). A 
party may extend the time to appeal from entry of a judgment or order by filing "a motion 
to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." 
Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(C). 
2
 Defendant also incorporates its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition and its Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Disposition into this section of Appellee's Brief. 
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However, when a party files a post-judgment motion, the following rule applies: 
A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of 
judgment, but before entry of an order disposing of any 
motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry 
of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice 
of appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying 
judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any 
motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal 
or an amended notice of appeal within the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order. 
Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2) (emphasis added). Based on the clear and unequivocal language 
of this rule, Plaintiffs were required to file an amended notice of appeal, but failed to do 
Plaintiffs filed three post-judgment motions, including a motion under Rule 59 to 
alter or amend the judgment, after the trial court prepared the initial Memorandum 
Decision granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 765-68.) The trial 
court denied these three post-judgment motions in a Memorandum Decision dated April 
1, 2009, which was not the final order of the court on these motions. (R. at 846-51.) 
Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on April 30, 2009. The trial court 
then entered a final order disposing of Plaintiffs' post-judgment motions on May 8, 2009. 
(R. at 865-68.) 
Under the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 4(b)(2), Plaintiffs' Notice of 
3
 The federal equivalent of this rule also requires the filing of an amended notice of appeal, and states: 
(ii) A party intending to challenge an order disposing of any motion listed in 
Rule 4(a)(4) A), or a judgment altered or amended upon such a motion, must file 
a notice of appeal, or an amended notice of appeal—in compliance with Rule 
3(c)—within the time prescribed by this Rule measured from the entry of the 
order disposing of the last such remaining motion. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). 
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Appeal, having been filed prior to entry of the order disposing of their Rule 59 motion, 
"is effective only to appeal from the underlying judgment." In this case, the Notice of 
Appeal conveys jurisdiction to this Court to review only the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment, and not the trial court's denial of the subsequent Rule 59 motion. 
In order to provide this Court jurisdiction to review the denial of their Rule 59 motion, 
Plaintiffs were required to file an amended notice of appeal within the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order pursuant to Rule 4(b)(2), which in this case was 
thirty (30) days after entry of the order denying such motion on May 8, 2009. However, 
Plaintiffs did not file an amended notice of appeal at any time after entry of the May 8, 
2009 order. Therefore, Plaintiffs' failure to file an amended notice of appeal prevents 
this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction to review the district court's denial 
of their Rule 59 motion. 
B. This Court Should Deny Plaintiffs' Request for Wholesale 
Abandonment of Rule 4(b)(2). 
Plaintiffs primarily argue that Rule 4(c) governs all appeals, including appeals of 
post-judgment motions, instead of Rule 4(b)(2), contrary to the plain language of these 
Rules. Prior to November 1, 2005, a party that filed a notice of appeal prior to 
disposition of any of the post-judgment motions listed in Rule 4 was required to file an 
amended notice of appeal. Otherwise, the entire notice of appeal was invalid. 
In an effort to ameliorate this harsh result, the Utah Supreme Court amended Rule 
4 and created subsection (b)(2), which validated any notice of appeal filed prior to entry 
of an order on any of the listed post-judgment motions. Based on this amendment, a 
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party was no longer required to file an amended notice of appeal to preserve its appeal of 
the "underlying judgment." However, Rule 4(b)(2) still required a party to file an 
amended notice of appeal in order to preserve an appeal from the trial court's ruling on 
the post-judgment motions, which did not constitute the "underlying judgment." 
Based on the creation of subsection (b)(2), this special rule only applied to cases 
where a party filed one of the listed post-judgment motions. Rule 4(c) applies to the rest 
of cases where no post-judgment motion is filed. However, Plaintiffs now urge this 
Court to conclude that Rule 4(c) should govern all notices of appeal, requiring 
abandonment of Rule 4(b)(2). This argument contradicts well-established statutory 
construction principles which require this Court to give meaning, if possible, to all 
provisions of a statute, or in this case, to a Rule of Appellate Procedure. See Lund v. 
Brown, 2000 UT 75, ^ 23 , 11 P.3d 277 (applying statutory construction principles to 
interpretation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) (citation omitted). Furthermore, "[a]ny 
interpretation which renders part or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous should 
be avoided." Id. (quoting State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995)). In this case, 
Plaintiffs urge this Court to make rule 4(b)(2) inoperative and superfluous. Therefore, 
giving meaning to Rule 4(b)(2), this Court should rule that Plaintiffs' failure to file an 
amended notice of appeal to include the three post-judgment motions prevents this Court 
from exercising jurisdiction over such motions. 
In addition to requesting that this Court render Rule 4(b)(2) meaningless, Plaintiffs 
also incorrectly interpret the clear language of this Rule in stating the following: 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision denying the 
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Casadays1 post-judgment motion was dated April 1, 2009, 
signed April 2, 2009, and filed April 7, 2009. The Casadays 
filed their notice of appeal on April 30, 2009, after the court 
announced its decision denying their post-judgment motion 
and within thirty days of the earliest possible date from which 
the time to appeal could have run. 
(Mem. Opp'n. Mot. Summ. Disposition, at 10 (emphasis added).) Such a conclusion that 
the appeal period could have run from the date of the Memorandum Decision on April 1, 
2009 contradicts Utah law. Plaintiffs elaborate on this misconstruction of Utah law in 
their "Response to Allstate's Statement of Facts," in which they state: 
However, the Memorandum Decision also did not state that it 
was not the final order of the court, and it did not direct 
counsel to prepare a written order. It simply said that 
"Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted." 
Thus, the January 9, 2009 Memorandum Decision could have 
constituted a final appealable order. 
{Id. at 3 (emphasis added).) Based on these statements, Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge the 
necessary application of the ruling in Code v. Utah Dept. of Health, 2007 UT 43, 162 
P.3d 1097. 
In Code, the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether a memorandum decision 
issued by a district court constituted entry of a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Id. 
at f 4. The Code court held that under Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
a memorandum decision does not constitute the final order of the court unless it explicitly 
so states. Id. at fflf 5-6. In that case, the memorandum decision did not state that it was 
the final order of the court, and did not instruct a party to prepare an order. Id. at f^ 5. In 
response to this factual scenario, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The plain language of rule 7(f)(2) does not permit overriding 
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the requirement of an order by implication or inference. 
Either an order must be submitted by the prevailing party or 
the court must give the parties explicit direction that no order 
is required. We see no benefit to a system in which parties 
must guess, on a case-by-case basis, whether a judge's 
language in a memorandum decision "implie[s]," "invite[s]," 
or "contemplate[s]" further action by the parties. Not only 
would such a system be unwise in practice, it is at odds with 
the express mandate of rule 7(f)(2). It is the district court's 
role to clearly direct that no order needs to be submitted; 
otherwise, an order is required. A court should include this 
explicit direction whenever it intends a document—a 
memorandum decision, minute entry, or other document—to 
constitute its final action. Otherwise, rule 7(f)(2) requires the 
preparation and filing of an order to trigger finality for 
purposes of appeal. 
Id. at f 6 (emphasis in original)(internal citations omitted). Here, neither party submitted 
a proposed order in conjunction with their memoranda, nor did the Memorandum 
Decision explicitly direct the parties to forego submission of an order. Therefore, based 
on the holding in Code, the trial court's Memorandum Decision dated April 1, 2009 did 
not constitute the final, appealable order, and did not commence the running of the 
limitations period for preserving the appeal. 
Given this misconstruction of Utah law, Plaintiffs argue that Rule 4(b)(2) should 
be limited only to situations where a notice of appeal is filed before announcement of a 
trial court's decision on a post-judgment motion, rather than to a notice of appeal filed 
after announcement of a decision. This argument lacks merit and reason, and begs the 
questions as to why any party would ever file a notice of appeal of a post-judgment 
motion before a trial court even rules on the motion. Although a party may anticipate 
losing a post-judgment motion, there is no reason to undergo the time and expense in 
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preparing a notice of appeal when the party does not even know the trial court's decision, 
let alone filing such an appeal with the court. Therefore, Plaintiffs' interpretation of Rule 
4(b)(2) would inappropriately and illogically restrict its scope to impossible scenarios. 
This Court should resist such a wholesale abandonment of Rule 4(b)(2) as 
Plaintiffs implicitly urge, and should hold that Plaintiffs' failure to file an amended notice 
of appeal after entry of the order disposing of their post-judgment motions prevents this 
Court from exercising jurisdiction over all issues other than the underlying judgment. 
C. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Review the Trial Court's Denial of 
Plaintiffs' Rule 15 Motions. 
In addition to the Rule 59 motion, Plaintiffs also filed two motions under Rules 
15(a) and 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, this Court also lacks 
jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of these two motions, each of which sought 
permission from the trial court to allow amendment of Plaintiffs' Complaint. This very 
Court established that a plaintiff cannot obtain relief in the form of amendment to a 
pleading under Rule 15 unless the trial court first grants either a Rule 59(e) or 60(b) 
motion. See National Advertising Co. v. Murray City Corp., 2006 UT App 75, % 13, 131 
P.3d 872 (citing Combs v. Price Waterhouse Coopers, 382 F.3d 1196, 1205 (10th Cir. 
2004) ("After a district court enters a final judgment it may not entertain motions for 
leave to amend unless the court first sets aside or vacates the judgment pursuant to [rules] 
59(e) or 60(b)."); Turville v. J & J Properties, L.C, 2006 UT App 305, f 28, 145 P.3d 
1146 (quoting Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231, 232 (Utah 1976)). 
In this case, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion. Based on Rule 4 
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of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Plaintiffs failed to preserve any right to appeal 
the denial of the Rule 59 motion for failing to file an amended notice of appeal after entry 
of the final order. Since Plaintiffs cannot obtain review of the trial court's denial of their 
Rule 59(e) motion, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the denial of the 
Plaintiffs' Rule 15 motions, because the prerequisite to such review, i.e. the granting of 
either a Rule 59(e) or 60(b) motion, is also outside the jurisdictional reach of this Court. 
Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of the Plaintiffs' 
Rule 15 motions. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' RULE 59(e) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE 
JUDGMENT. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that Plaintiffs had somehow properly 
preserved their appeal of the trial court's denial of their three post-judgment motions 
despite their failure to comply with Rule 4(b)(2), the trial court still did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. In 
order to merit relief under Rule 59(e), a party must show any of the grounds set forth 
under Rule 59(a). See Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City, 590 P.2d 309, 311 
(Utah 1979). In this case, Plaintiffs claim entitlement to relief based on (1) "[A]buse of 
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial[;] (6) Insufficiency 
of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law[;] and (7) 
Error in law." (R. at 728; Appellants5 Br. at 34.) 
In sole support of their Rule 59(e) motion, Plaintiffs raised a new argument which 
they had not raised during the summary judgment proceedings—that they mistakenly 
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alleged the wrong statute in their Complaint. That argument lacks any merit in light of 
Plaintiffs5 other allegations herein. Despite this new argument, the trial court found that 
Plaintiffs had failed to establish entitlement to relief under Rule 59(e) for several reasons. 
Plaintiffs' new argument of erroneous citation to the wrong statute lacks merit and the 
cases cited by Plaintiffs support Defendant's position. Finally, Plaintiffs have 
misconstrued the basis for the trial court's denial of their motion. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court cited to several justifications which 
support its denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion, and which show that it did not abuse 
its discretion. First, the trial court noted that Plaintiffs were attempting to raise a new 
argument which had not been previously raised in their Complaint. (R. at 866.) Second, 
Plaintiffs failed to distinguish the Asael case or otherwise show its inapplicability to the 
present case. (Id.) Third, Plaintiffs' new argument was directly contrary to the argument 
made in their Complaint, i.e. that Plaintiffs had a "new" policy requiring Defendant to 
comply with Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-22-305(9)(b). (Id.) Fourth, Plaintiffs had not even 
made an attempt, prior to the grant of summary judgment, to seek leave to amend their 
Complaint to include their new argument. (R. at 867.) Fifth, Plaintiffs were attempting 
to contravene the trial court's case management order by attempting to raise new claims 
after all discovery deadlines had passed, and after they realized that their claims failed as 
a matter of law. (Id.) 
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B. Plaintiffs' Claim That They Cited to the Wrong Statute in Error Lacks 
Merit. 
Once Plaintiffs determined that their Complaint failed to meel Utah's liberal 
pleading standard, they raised a new argument which they failed to raise during the 
summary judgment proceedings. This new argument alleges that Plaintiffs simply cited 
to the wrong statute, as if it were some type of clerical error. (R. at 732-35; Appellants' 
Br. at 3, 34.) This argument lacks merit in light of the other allegations in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. 
Paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs' Complaint specifically alleges that "plaintiffs were 
insured by defendant under an automobile insurance policy which was issued by 
defendant after January 1, 200IT (R. at 2, % 4 (emphasis added).) Also, Plaintiffs' 
Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs never signed a UIM acknowledgment form for 
Defendant. (R. at 2, j^ 8.) Such signed acknowledgement forms are required only for 
new policies, not for existing policies as of January 1, 2001. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-305(9)(g). For Plaintiffs to claim that their reference to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
305(9)(b) was simply an error on their part, would require this Court to ignore all other 
efforts by Plaintiffs to allege that Defendant failed to comply with the statutory 
requirements specific to "new" insurance policies issued after January 1, 2001 as stated in 
this statute. Plaintiffs' "new policy" argument was central to Plaintiffs' allegation of 
supposed bad faith, so Plaintiffs cannot discard that claim so easily. 
C. The Cases Cited by Plaintiffs Support Defendant's Position, 
Additionally, in their Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Motion to Alter 
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or Amend the Judgment, to Conform the Pleadings to the Evidence, or For Leave to 
Amend, Plaintiffs cite to several cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that a 
mere recitation to an incorrect statute should not deprive a party from pursuing claims. 
(R. at 817 n. 14-15.) However, these cases support Defendant's position that it did not 
have adequate notice of Plaintiffs' new argument regarding their "existing" insurance 
policy. 
For example, Plaintiffs cite to the case of Huss v. Green Spring Health Serv., Inc., 
18 F.Supp2d 400,402 (D. Del. 1998) (R. at 817 n. 15.), where the United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware quoted from Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure §1210, and stated: "[a] reference to the wrong statute . . . will be corrected by 
the court if it can determine the appropriate statute . . .from the complaint.'" 18 
F.Supp.2d 400, 402 (emphasis added) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1210, at 121.) By this very standard, the trial 
court could not have determined which statute Plaintiffs intended to reference based on 
the allegations in their Complaint. The Complaint simply stated the allegations that 
Plaintiffs had a "new" policy and that Defendant failed to provide coverage based on 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b) and Utah law. (R. at 4-5, ffij 12-16.) However, 
nothing in the Complaint would lead the trial court, Defendant, or this Court, to 
determine Plaintiffs' reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(g) regarding 
"existing" policies as a separate basis for recovery. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs cite to the case of Roman v. City oj Middletown Bd. ofEduc, 
(R. at 817 n. 15.) for the proposition that a court should not grant summary judgment 
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"against a plaintiff based on her reference to the wrong statutes because "the facts 
pleadfed] in the Complaint do state a cause of action " under the correct statute. " 
(Mem. Supp. Mot. to Alter or Amend 8 n.15 (emphasis added) (quoting 2007 WL 
866480, at *3 (Conn. Super Ct. 2007)). 
Plaintiffs' errors amount to more than a mere incorrect citation to the appropriate 
statute—they represent a failure altogether to support any claim under subsection "g." 
Here, Plaintiffs' Complaint completely failed to advise Defendant of the factual essence 
of their new bad faith theory. Furthermore, this effort to change the factual basis for a 
bad faith claim reveals the mercurial nature of the claim, and its lack of legitimacy. This 
Court should resist Plaintiffs' mischaracterization of the failure in their Complaint as 
merely a citation to a wrong statute and uphold the trial court's decision to grant 
summary judgment due to Plaintiffs' failure to even allege any facts to support their 
claims under subsection "g" and their failure even to request leave of court to amend their 
Complaint. 
D, Plaintiffs Misconstrue the Trial Court's Basis for Grant of Summary 
Judgment and Denial of Their Rule 59(e) Motion. 
In addition to improperly characterizing their citation to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-305(9)(b) as a mere error in citation, Plaintiffs have misconstrued the basis for the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment or denial of their motion to alter or amend the 
judgment under Rule 59(e). In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs sumraarize the trial court's 
actions in granting summary judgment and denying their Rule 59(e) motion by stating 
that the trial court "held that the Casadays' reference in their complaint to subsection (b) 
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of section 31 A-22-305(9) was fatal to their claims." (Appellants' Br. at 34.) This was 
not the trial court's basis for granting summary judgment or denying their motion. What 
was "fatal to their claims" was Plaintiffs' failure to make a single allegation in the 
Complaint to put Defendant on notice of their new claim under subsection "g." 
The trial court relied on this Court's decision in Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck 
Ins. Exch., 2008 UT App 315, 193 P.3d 650 to grant Defendant summary judgment. (R. 
at 720-21; see also R. at 801, J^ 7 (discussing Plaintiffs' contradictory new claim).) It 
should be noted that Plaintiffs failed even to cite the Asael case in their entire appellate 
brief, much less to distinguish it from the present case. Based on that case, it became 
apparent that Plaintiffs' new argument, which took a completely contradictory position to 
that stated in their Complaint, could not withstand the analysis set forth by this Court. 
In summary, even if this Court were to find that it has jurisdiction of Plaintiff s 
Rule 59(e) motion despite Plaintiffs' failure to comply with Rule 4(b)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court should still find that the trial court did not abuse 
its broad discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment under 
Rule 59(e). Plaintiffs' sole argument in support of this motion is that they made an error 
in citing to the wrong statute. This argument, however, lacks merit based on the obvious 
reference to this statute in paragraphs 4 and 8 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, which specifically 
states that their insurance policy was obtained after January 1, 2001 and refers to 
requirements applicable only to new policies. Furthermore, the cases which Plaintiffs 
rely on to support their claim of erroneous citation ironically support Defendant's 
position that nothing in the Complaint could point to Plaintiffs' new basis of recovery 
31 
under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(g). Finally, Plaintiffs have misconstrued the 
basis of the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment and deny their Rule 59(e) 
motion, and have failed altogether even to mention the Asael case, on which the trial 
court relied heavily for support of its rulings. Therefore, this Court should uphold the 
trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' RULE 
15(b) MOTION TO CONFORM THE PLEADINGS TO THE EVIDENCE. 
This Court should uphold the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs'' Rule 15(b) motion 
to conform the pleadings to the evidence, for four reasons. First, Rule 15(b) does not 
apply to motions for summary judgment. Second, even if this Rule applied, Defendant 
failed to file this motion on a timely basis. Third, the trial court could not grant relief 
under this Rule because it denied Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion. Fourth, Defendant never 
"tried" any issue not raised in the pleadings by express or implied consent. 
A. Rule 15(b) Does Not Apply to Summary Judgment Proceedings. 
Rule 15(b) does not even apply to motions for summary judgment. Although 
Plaintiffs assert that "Rule 15(b) applies to motions as well as to trials," (R. at 736; 
Appellants' Br. at 35.), they overlook Utah law in making such a bold assertion.4 
Whether Rule 15(b) applies to motions for summary judgment in Utah has never been 
specifically decided by our courts. See Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243, ^[35, 
166 P.3d 639. In fact, there is stronger case law support for the assertion that Rule 15(b) 
does not apply to motions for summary judgment. See id. at % 35 n.13. Rule 15(b) makes 
4
 This Court should note that in making this assertion, Plaintiffs cite to New York and South Dakota cases for 
support, and not to a Utah case. 
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sense in the context of trials, where evidence is submitted, not in the context of pre-trial 
motions. 
The Eldridge court points out that a split exists among the federal circuits as to 
whether Rule 15(b) applies to summary judgments as opposed to trials. Id. at [^35 n.13. 
However, the court also pointed out that most recently, the Utah Supreme Court has cited 
with approval the case of Domar Ocean Transp. v. Independent Refining Co., 783 F.2d 
1185,1188 (5th Cir. 1986), which states that implied consent only applies if parties 
recognized that an issue not raised in the pleadings was admitted at trial. Id. (citing 
Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409,413 (Utah 1998) and Keller v. SouthwoodN. Med. 
Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1998) for support that Rule 15(b) only applies to 
trials and not to summary judgments). 
Additionally, nothing in Rule 15(b) specifically allows its application on a motion 
for summary judgment and, in fact, specifically states that it applies only to "trials." Rule 
15(b) used the word "tried" once and "trial" twice. Therefore, consistent with the recent 
trend in Utah courts in acknowledging that Rule 15(b) applies to "trials," and based on 
the clear and unambiguous language of the Rule itself, this Court should hold that Rule 
15(b) does not apply in this case after the granting of summary judgment. 
B. Plaintiffs Failed to File a Timely Motion Under Rule 15(b). 
Utah courts have long held that denial of a motion to amend based on untimeliness 
is not an abuse of discretion. See Atcitty v. Bd. ofEduc. of San Juan Cty. Sch. Dist, 967 
P.2d 1261 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In Atcitty, the court addressed the timeliness of 
plaintiffs motion to amend and held the following: 
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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying appellant's Motion to Amend. First, appellant 
attempted to set forth new issues in his amended complaint. 
Second, appellant filed his motion approximately two-and-a-
half months after the discovery deadline, and after both 
parties had filed summary judgment motions. Third, we 
conclude that appellant was aware of the unew issues " raised 
in the amended complaint long before his motion was filed, 
and that there was no justifiable reason for the delay. We 
therefore affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's Motion 
to Amend his complaint. 
Id. at 1264-65 (emphasis added). In this case, Plaintiffs run afoul of each of the factors 
addressed in Atcitty, except that Plaintiffs' actions are even more egregious. Plaintiffs 
certainly waited until well over one year after the original case management order 
deadline for fact discovery had passed (R. at 38) and over eight months passed after the 
amended scheduling order deadline for fact discovery (R. at 238) before filing their 
Motion for Leave to Amend. Second, Plaintiffs waited until after Defendant had filed its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 419-20.) Third, by Plaintiffs' own admissions, 
they were aware of the "new" issue raised in their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment long before they filed their motion. (R. at 434, 445.) Finally, 
Plaintiffs have failed to provide any justifiable reason for the delay.5 Therefore, this 
Court should find that Plaintiffs' Rule 15(b) motion was untimely in light of the broad 
discretion applicable to such a finding. 
C. The Trial Court Could Not Grant Relief Under Rule 15(b) Based on its 
Denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) Motion. 
As more fully briefed in Part II.C, supra, the trial court did not err in denying 
5
 Plaintiffs only unjustified reason is that they believed that simply alleging that Defendant had breached "Utah law" 
was all that was necessary to meet Utah's liberal pleading standard and that they believed that their Complaint was 
sufficiently broad to include the new claim. (Appellants' Br. at 46.) 
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Plaintiffs' Rule 15(b) motion because it did not grant Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion, a 
prerequisite to such relief. Without amending the judgment, the trial court could not 
allow amendment of a pleading. See National Advertising Co. v. Murray City Corp., 
2006 UT App 75, % 13, 131 P.3d 872. Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial 
court's denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 15(b) motion. 
D. Defendant Never Expressly or Impliedly Tried Any Issue Not Raised in 
the Pleadings. 
"To determine whether a trial court properly denied a motion to amend the 
complaint to conform to the evidence, we first review for correctness the trial 'court's 
conclusion that the parties tried [or did not try] an issue by express or implied consent.'" 
Eldridge, 2007 UT App 243 at [^19 (quoting Fibro Trust, Inc. v Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 
UT 13, | 8, 974 P.2d 288. Based on rule 15(b), there are "two situations in which a party 
may seek to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. The first situation—the 
mandatory amendment—requires the trial court to allow amendment of the pleadings if 
the parties tried the issues by express or implied consent." Id. at f 36. "The second 
situation—the permissive amendment—applies where the parties did not try the issue by 
express or implied consent." Id. at f 37. "[I]n instances where the parties did not try the 
issues by express or implied consent, 
[t]he trial court's discretion to grant amendment of the 
pleadings is conditioned on the satisfaction of two 
preliminary requirements: [1] a finding that the presentation 
of the merits of the action will be subserved by amendment 
and [2] a finding that the admission of such evidence would 
not prejudice the adverse party. . . . The trial court has only 
limited discretion in making these preliminary findings 
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Id. (quoting Fibro Trust, Inc., 1999 UT 13 at [^ 9). Finally, 
if the parties did not try the issues by express or implied 
consent but the two preliminary requirements have been met, 
"the trial court has full discretion to allow amendment of the 
pleadings; that is, it may grant or deny a party's motion for 
amendment upon any reasonable basis, and the court's 
decision can be reversed only if abuse of discretion appears." 
Id. Here, the trial court never ruled as to whether Defendant had "tried" the "existing" 
policy claim under subsection "g." However, if it had, it is irrefutable that Defendant 
neither expressly nor impliedly consented to this new argument. Defendant filed its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 419-20.) Plaintiffs filed a responsive 
memorandum in opposition, arguing the subsection (g) existing insurance policy position. 
(R. at 432-46.) Defendant expressly refused to engage Plaintiffs on that issue in 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (Ex. 
"l,"at2-8.))6 
This very Court in Eldridge specifically found that no "trial" of new issues 
occurred where a party "clearly objected to the [plaintiffs'] introduction of new claims 
whenever they arose. 2007 UT App 243 at <f 38. Plaintiffs raised their new claim under 
subsection "g" for "existing" policies for the very first time in their Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 443-48.) At the very first 
opportunity, Defendants made clear their objection to the introduction of Plaintiffs' new 
claim in its Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (Ex. " 1 , " 
at 2-8.) Defendant has never consented to Plaintiffs' request that this Court consider this 
6
 The trial court entered an order under Rule 11(h) supplementing the record to include Defendant's Reply Memo in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, attached as Ex. "1.") 
36 
new claim. 
Despite Defendant's clear objections to the introduction of Plaintiffs' new claims, 
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant impliedly consented to this new claim in its affirmative 
defense and by failing to object to Plaintiffs' response to Defendant's request for 
admissions when Plaintiffs were asked to admit that subsection "b" did not apply. 
(Appellants' Br. at 37.) However, this argument only supports Defendants' contention 
that it disputed Plaintiffs' claims raised in their Complaint. Furthermore, Defendant had 
no reason to object to Plaintiffs' admission that subsection "b" did not apply, since 
Defendant's position was always that subsection "b" was in applicable. Plaintiffs' claims 
that a substantial amount of discovery took place on subsection "g" is also unavailing 
since Plaintiffs were entitled to conduct discovery on any of Defendant's affirmative 
defenses, which included the defense that subsection "b" did not apply because Plaintiffs 
did not have a "new" policy. Ultimately, Defendant never consented to trial of any part 
of Plaintiffs' new claims under subsection "g." Discovery does not constitute trial of an 
issue. Even if this Court made the unlikely finding that discovery in this case showed an 
implicit "trial" of the new claim, the trial court still had a wide range of discretion in 
denying amendment under Rule 15(b)'s permissive prong. Therefore, this Court should 
uphold the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 15(b) motion. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' RULE 15(a) MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THEIR 
COMPLAINT. 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' Rule 15(a) 
motion for leave to amend their complaint. For the reasons stated in Part IV.B., supra, 
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Plaintiffs' Rule 15(a) motion is also untimely. Furthermore, for the reasons stated in Part 
IV.C, supra, the trial court could not have granted relief under Rule 15(a) because it did 
not grant relief under Rule 59(e). Thus, the trial court had no choice but to deny 
Plaintiffs Rule 15(a) motion. Alternatively, and despite these two compelling reasons 
for the trial court's denial of this motion, Plaintiffs have otherwise failed to show 
entitlement to relief under Rule 15(a). 
Utah courts focus on a three-pronged test for determining the appropriateness of 
granting a motion to amend under Rule 15(a). In Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 
the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "[i]n analyzing the grant or denial of a motion to 
amend, Utah courts have focused on three factors: the timeliness of the motion; the 
justification given by the movant for the delay; and the resulting prejudice to the 
responding party." Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, f 26, 87 P.3d 
734 (quoting Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), rev'don other grounds by 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992)). 
However, "courts should not regard these three factors as an exclusive list." Kelly, 
2004 UT App 44 at f 39. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "the[se] factors 
should be considered alongside any other factors that the trial court might deem relevant 
in a particular case." Id. at f 40 (emphasis added) (citing Aurora Credit Servs., v. Liberty 
West. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Utah 1998)). "[T]his open-factored approach is 
consistent with the broad grant of discretion that is afforded to trial courts when ruling on 
motions to amend" because 
[tjrial courts are in a much better position than appellate 
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courts to make such case-specific determinations as whether 
too much time has passed to fairly allow an amendment, 
whether a party's delay is the result of an unfair tactic or 
dilatory motive, or whether some other unforeseen factor 
militates for or against a particular result in that particular 
case. . . . Thus, insofar as our earlier cases have perhaps led 
some to conclude that rule 15(a) is governed by an exclusive 
three-part analysis, we now wish to stress that the motion to 
amend analysis is instead a multi-factored, flexible inquiry 
that allows trial courts the leeway to evaluate the factual 
circumstances and legal developments involved in each 
particular case. 
Kelly, 2004 UT App 44 at f U . 
Unfortunately, the trial court did not reach this analysis in denying Plaintiffs' Rule 
15(a) motion. With this backdrop, this Court should uphold the trial court's denial of 
Plaintiffs' motion to amend under Rule 15(a). Plaintiffs' motion is indisputably 
untimely. It came several months after the end of fact discovery, after Defendant filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and after the trial court granted summary judgment. 
Also, Plaintiffs have never given a single, justifiable reason as to why they waited so long 
to seek leave to amend their Complaint, stating that they simply believed their reference 
to breach of "Utah law" somehow met Utah's notice pleading standard. Finally, 
Defendant would be extremely prejudiced by the untimely amendment of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint in that they would have to re-open fact discovery, determine whether 
additional experts are needed, change their entire litigation strategy, re-depose several 
witnesses, and incur the additional expenses of such discovery, all based on Plaintiffs' 
7
 The trial court denied the Rule 15(a) motion because Plaintiffs' had not met their burden under Rule 59(e) and had 
not distinguished the Asael case. (R. at 849.) Even if this Court allowed amendment of the judgment under Rule 
59(e), it would have to remand back to the trial court the decision as to whether amendment under either Rule 15(a) 
or 15(b) is appropriate in light of the broad discretion given to trial courts in deciding these issues. 
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failure to adequately plead the claims they now contend to have been adequately raised in 
their Complaint. 
In Kelly, this Court reversed the trial court's denial of plaintiff s motion to amend. 
2004 UT App 44 at *f 47. In doing so, the court discussed reasons why plaintiffs motion 
to amend should have been granted. The court stated: 
Under the general principles set forth above, we conclude that 
the trial court should have granted Kelly's motion to amend. 
We first note that the litigation was still in its initial 
procedural stages when Kelly filed his motion to amend. The 
trial court had not yet established any deadlines for discovery 
or for the filing of amended complaints, nor had the court yet 
set a date for trial or entered any rulings dismissing any of the 
claims or parties. Kelly's motion to amend was filed on April 
2, 2002, barely six months after the filing of the original 
complaint. This litigation had not yet concluded its first year, 
let alone gone through the several years of litigation that are 
typically present in cases of untimeliness. 
Further, it does not appear from the record that Kelly's delay 
in seeking leave to add the additional claims was motivated 
by a dilatory or improper motive. 
Id. at Yh 49-50. Every single one of these factors weighs against Plaintiffs and in 
Defendant's favor. 
First, the litigation in this case was not in its initial procedural stage when 
Plaintiffs filed their motions to amend; rather the case was concluded by summary 
judgment. Second, this Court had already established a deadline for fact discovery, 
which ended on December 31, 2007 under the original Case Management Order. (R. at 
38.) Plaintiffs' motions to amend were filed well over two years after commencement of 
this action. Finally, based on Plaintiffs' failure to provide a single reason or justification 
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for failing to seek leave to amend earlier, no other reason for their failure exists other 
than a dilatory or improper motive. 
In addition to the fact that each of these factors weigh heavily in Defendant's 
favor, it is not essential that every factor weigh in Defendant's favor. In addressing 
whether any particular factor is more important than the other when considering a motion 
to amend, this Court stated: 
Finally, although the general approach should be multi-
factored, the circumstances of a particular case may be such 
that a court's ruling on a motion to amend can be predicated 
on only one of two of the particular factors. See First City 
Bank, N.A. v. Air Capitol Aircraft Sales, Inc., 820 F.2d 1127, 
1133 (10th Cir. 1987) ("We hold that a district court acts 
within the bounds of its discretion when it denies leave to 
amend for 'untimeliness" or 'undue delay.' Prejudice to the 
opposing party need not be shown also."). Thus, depending 
on the facts of a particular case, the weight that a court gives 
to one or another particular factor may vary. 
Kelly, 2004 UT App 44 at f^ 42. Thus, while all of the factors listed above support denial 
of Plaintiffs' motion to amend under Rule 15(a), this Court can give different weight to 
any particular factor. 
In addition, as noted previously, Plaintiffs' effort to amend is not legitimate. 
Plaintiffs contended in their Complaint that Defendant acted in bad faith because it 
refused to acknowledge that the insurance policy at issue was a new policy. When they 
ultimately concluded that this argument was fallacious, they persisted in their assertion of 
bad faith but tried to find a different fact or theory to support their bad faith claims. 
Essentially, they started with the conclusion—bad faith—then worked backwards to find 
theories or facts to support it, all without making a formal change to their Complaint. 
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In summary, Plaintiffs' Rule 15(a) motion is untimely. More importantly, the trial 
court properly denied this motion based on its denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion. 
Despite these two compelling reasons, and applying the very analysis and factors used by 
the Holmes and Kelly courts, this Court should find that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Plaintiffs Rule 15(a) motion. 
CONCLUSION 
This case deals with Plaintiffs' unfounded contention that they are entitled to more 
UIM coverage than what they were actually paying for, and what their insurance policy 
actually stated. Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant claiming that Defendant failed to 
obtain the signed acknowledgement form required of a "new" insurance policy, 
implicating Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b). The suit alleged that Defendant had 
acted in bad faith in failing to procure the waiver. However, once it became apparent to 
Plaintiffs that their argument failed as a matter of law, they raised a new argument that 
their policy was in fact an "existing" policy, implicating Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
305(9)(g), still claiming that Defendant acted in bad faith. It is appzirent that Plaintiffs 
intended to pursue an insurance bad faith claim no matter what the facts were. That is, 
Plaintiffs started with the conclusion that Defendant had committed bad faith, and then 
sought out facts or theories to support the claim; they allowed the result (bad faith 
damages) to dictate their claims ("new" or "existing" policy.) 
This Court should uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on 
Plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead their new claim arising under Utah Code Ann. § 
31 A-22-305(9)(g). This Court should also rule that Plaintiffs' failure to comply with 
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Rule 4(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure prevents it from exercising 
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs5 three post-judgment motions. Alternatively, this Court should 
find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) 
motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence, based on the numerous justifications 
given by the trial court. Without alteration or amendment of the judgment, Plaintiffs 
could not obtain amendment of their pleadings pursuant to either Rules 15(a) or 15(b). 
Consistent with the trial court's reasoning in granting summary judgment and denying 
Plaintiffs' three post-judgment motions, this Court should uphold such rulings. 
ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary as all pertinent statutes and rules are listed verbatim in 
this brief. 
DATED this 28th day of October, 2009. 
T MILLER NELSON 
A. Morgan 
'Rafael A. Seminario 
Attorneys for Appellee/Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND E. CASADAY and ELLEN 
CASADAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
tivil No. 060916782 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
Defendant Allstate Insurance Company, by and through its counsel of record, Lynn S. 
Davies, Melinda A. Morgan, and Rafael A. Seminario of the law firm of RICHARDS BRANDT 
MILLER NELSON, hereby submits this Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment pursuant to Rules 7 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the claims and issues raised in Plaintiffs' 
* % . , cr Qou* ' % 
rC 
^%r~ 
Complaint. This complaint alleges that Plaintiffs had a "new policy" in 2001, that they never 
signed a waiver of underinsured motorist coverage, and that Allstate therefore failed to comply 
with Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b). All claims and all theories of recovery stated in 
Plaintiffs' complaint stem from the alleged violation of this specific statute. However, based on 
the memoranda submitted by both parties related to this Motion for Summary Judgment, no 
dispute exists that Plaintiffs' insurance policy was in fact an "existing" policy and not a "new" 
policy as alleged by Plaintiffs. In fact, Plaintiffs have specifically stated that they "concede that 
their policy would likely be considered as an existing policy, rather than a new policy.. . ." 
(PL's Mem. Opp'n. Summ. J. 4.) Such an admission entitles Defendant to summary judgment. 
In opposing summary judgment, Plaintiffs offer two arguments: (1) that their complaint 
should be liberally construed so as to create claims not raised in their Complaint, and (2) that 
questions of material fact exist on the unstated theories they now wish to present, i.e., the issue 
of the SB 189 notice under §31A-22-305(9)(h). With regard to their first argument, Utah 
appellate law unequivocally states that Plaintiffs' failure to include claims and grounds for such 
claims in their complaint precludes this Court from addressing such claims in Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Regarding their second argument, this Court may not consider 
it because Defendant has not even raised this issue in its summary judgment motion and because 
the Complaint failed to raise SB 189 as an issue in this case, in stark contrast to the long-
established and basic jurisprudential principle that claims are restricted to those raised in the 
Complaint. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST TO PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
This Court should grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based on the 
admissions made in Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum. In it, Plaintiffs "concede that their 
policy would likely be considered as an existing policy, rather than a new policy . . . ." (PL's 
Mem. Opp'n. Summ. J. 4.) This admission refutes the allegations made in their own complaint 
that Defendant failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b). That was their only 
stated basis for all claims in their complaint. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have admitted that their 
own experts agree that Defendant did not violate § 31A-22-305(9)(b). (See PL's Mem. Opp'n. 
Summ. J. 5.) As a result, no dispute exists as to Defendant's entitlement to summary judgment 
on the claims raised in Plaintiffs' complaint. 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH UTAH'S NOTICE 
PLEADING STANDARD, WHICH PREVENTS THEM FROM PURSUING 
THEIR SB 189 CLAIM. 
Utah law does not allow Plaintiffs to disregard their complaint and pursue claims not 
previously and adequately raised. Plaintiffs argue that they did comply, and in support of this 
argument, Plaintiffs cite (a) to several rules of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and (b) to some 
Utah cases which they believe support their position. These arguments fail in light of the clear 
and unequivocal position that Utah appellate courts have taken on this issue over the last half 
century. 
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a. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Comply With the Rules They Cite in Support of 
Their Claim of Compliance with Utah's Notice Pleading Standard. 
Plaintiffs erroneously rely on Rule 8(e)(1), 8(f), and 1(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to support their claim that they have preserved their SB 189 claim. Rather than 
dispute their entitlement to recovery based on the allegations in their complaint related to § 31A-
22-305(9)(b), which they now understand to fail as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have stated that the 
allegations, claims, and grounds in their complaint allow them to pursue a claim not explicitly 
raised in their complaint. Rule 8(e)(1) requires allegations to be "simple, concise and direct," 
Rule 8(f) requires courts to construe pleadings in a manner consistent with "substantial justice," 
and Rule 1(a) requires courts to "liberally construe" pleadings. Plaintiffs have complied with all 
of these requirements as they relate to their claims under § 31 A-22-305(9)(b); Defendant has 
never argued to the contrary. However, Plaintiffs have completely failed to comply with these 
requirements as they relate to their SB 189 claim. 
It is well settled under Utah law that "a plaintiff is required, under [Utah's] liberal 
pleading standard of notice pleading, to submit a "short and plain statement. . . showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief and "a demand for judgment for the relief" Canfield v. Layton City, 
2005 UT 60, 14, 122 P.3d 622 (omission in original) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)-(2)). In 
addition, "[t]he plaintiff must only give the defendant 'fair notice of the nature and basis or 
grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Id. (citation 
omitted). However, "zf must do at least that much." Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 
2008 UT App 315, % 17, 193 P.3d 650 (emphasis added) (citing Harper v. Evans, 2008 UT App 
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165, K 13, 185 P.3d 573. Here, Plaintiffs have not done "at least that much." Instead, Plaintiffs 
have cited to the following portions of their complaint to support their argument that they have 
provided the required "fair notice" to defendant: 
12. In violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts, 
defendant advised plaintiffs that their policy of insurance only provided 
underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $10,000, up to $20,000 
per occurrence. 
15. The defendant has refused to pay the limits of underinsured 
motorist coverage required.. .by law. 
The two citations accomplish only one thing—to allege that "Utah law" has been violated. 
Plaintiffs now ask this Court to find that a reference to a breach of "Utah law" provides sufficient 
notice to Defendant of the nature and basis of the claims asserted. Defendant cannot be expected 
to canvas the entirety of "Utah law" to divine the claims Plaintiffs might someday assert. 
Otherwise, all a plaintiff would have to do in a complaint is make a bald assertion that "Utah 
law" has been violated in order to maintain a cause of action. Fortunately, several Utah courts 
have addressed this issue and have refuted the position taken by Plaintiffs. 
In Asael, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether the allegations in the plaintiffs 
complaint satisfied the "fair notice" requirements stated above. The court stated: 
Nowhere in the third amended complaint, or in the three complaints that preceded 
it, does [plaintiff] allege that any of the defendants had actually bound adequate 
coverage but refused to pay the amounts due under that orally bound policy. 
Rather [plaintiffs] claims, which all arise out of its contention that the defendants 
failed to ensure that [plaintiff] was covered for all of its significant risks, are 
directly contrary to such a position. And we see nothing in the complaint to 
suggest that [plaintiff] intended to assert the existence of adequate coverage as an 
alternative theory. Consequently, the third amended complaint does not give 
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Appellees fair notice of the nature and basis of the oral binder theory and was 
therefore not properly before the court at the time of summary judgment. 
2008 UT App 315, Tfl8 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This case reveals three important 
similarities to the present case. First, the court did not allow the plaintiff to present a claim that 
was "directly contrary" to its previous position, which also applies in this case. Plaintiff first 
claimed that their insurance policy was a "new" policy. The only other option was that such a 
policy constituted an "existing" policy, which is exactly opposite of their claim that it was 
"new." Second, the court analyzed "the complaint" to see if the claim was raised as an alternate 
theory, and made no attempt to determine whether discovery had occurred on that particular 
claim or whether the opposing party had some other "notice" and opportunity to defend which 
Plaintiff claim applies. Finally, the court held that this new issue was "not properly before the 
court at the time of summary judgment." Plaintiffs similarly request that this Court consider the 
SB 189 claim "at the time of summary judgment," which the Court of Appeals has expressly 
denied. Ultimately, the Asael court concluded as follows: 
[Plaintiffs] oral binder claim was first raised, after approximately three years of 
discovery, in Farr's memorandum in opposition to [defendant's] motion for 
summary judgment. Rejecting this tactic, the Utah Supreme Court explained: "A 
plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or theories for 
recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment because such amendment^n/s to satisfy Utah 's pleading requirements." 
Id. at f 18 (quoting Holmes Dev, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, K 31, 48 P.3d 895) (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted). Plaintiffs have also failed to satisfy Utah's pleading requirements. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also addressed the tactics being used by Plaintiffs in 
Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook. In Holmes, the plaintiff attempted to raise new claims for breach of 
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duties outside those duties imposed by the contract at issue and which plaintiff had not raised in 
its complaint. 2002 UT 38, f 30. The court responded by stating that the "claim was originally 
raised in [plaintiffs] memorandum in opposition to [defendant's] motion to dismiss/for summary 
judgment, and was not raised in the complaint. . . . [Plaintiffs] claims must therefore be 
restricted to the grounds set forth in the complaint." Id. at \ 31 (emphasis added). Again, the 
Utah Supreme Court did not analyze or address whether the defendant had an opportunity to 
engage in discovery related to the new claim raised for the first time or whether they had 
adequate notice beyond the notice required in the complaint. Likewise, this Court should not 
allow Plaintiffs to raise their new SB 189 claim when considering this motion for summary 
judgment. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Harper v. Evans came to the same conclusion reached by 
numerous Utah courts regarding Plaintiffs attempt to make new claims not raised in their 
complaint. In Harper, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant "negligently performed the 
November 2002 surgeries 'and nothing more.'" 2008 UT App 165, ^  13, 185 P.3d 573 (quoting 
Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, ^  11 n.9, 984 P.2d 960). However, plaintiff attempted to raise a 
new argument of defendant's negligent course of treatment after the surgeries. The court held 
that "[t]hese allegations, standing alone, do not state a claim for relief for continuous negligent 
treatment, even under Utah 's liberal notice pleading requirements." Harper, 2008 UT App 165, 
f 13. The court further explained: 
In so holding, we emphasize that we cannot rely on the allegations of a negligent 
course of treatment raised for the first time in the Harpers' opposition to summary 
judgment.... The Harpers were free to seek leave to amend their complaint to 
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allege new or different causes of action, see Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), but having 
failed to do so they could not effectively raise such new claims in their opposition 
brief. See Holmes Dev., 2002 UT 38, ^  31, 48 P.3d 895 (stating that in the 
absence of proper amendment, "claims must . . . be restricted to the grounds set 
forth in the complaint"). 
Id. at H 14. Plaintiffs have not even sought to amend their complaint, presumably because Utah 
case law would prohibit them from amending at this late stage in litigation, especially when trial 
has been set and Defendant would be prejudiced by being required to file an answer to an 
amended complaint, re-open discovery, and further delay resolution of this matter. In any event, 
this Court should not consider any claims that have not been timely and properly raised. 
b. The Utah Cases Plaintiffs Cite in Support of Their Claim of Compliance with 
Utah's Notice Pleading Standard are Easily Distinguishable, and 
Inapplicable. 
In support of their claim of compliance with Utah's notice pleading standard, Plaintiffs 
cite to Blackham v. A.M. Snelgrove for the proposition of "fair notice," and to Timm v. Dewsnup 
for the proposition that the "pleadings are never more important than the case." However, each 
of these cases is easily distinguishable and inapplicable to the present case. 
In 1955, the Utah Supreme Court in Blackham dealt with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and held that the plaintiffs complaint 
was sufficiently pled. 280 P.2d 453, 453, 455 (Utah 1955). However, a Rule 12(b)(6) standard 
is completely different from the standard and issue in the present case. There, the plaintiff made 
allegations of entitlement to money; defendant claimed that plaintiffs failure to allege that he 
was the "owner" of the money merited dismissal. Id. at 453. The court concluded that plaintiff 
had sufficiently pled entitlement to the money because "it [did] not appear to a certainty that 
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plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support 
of the claim." Id. at 455. This issue does not apply to the present case. Defendant has never 
alleged that Plaintiffs' complaint was insufficient as a matter of law. Indeed, Plaintiffs have 
successfully alleged Defendant's failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b), 
although now proven wrong. However, whether Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to 
withstand dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is completely different from the issue of whether they 
have even raised a claim for purposes of summary judgment. The case law cited above refutes 
their claim that they adequately and timely raised the SB 189 isstie. 
Plaintiffs also cite to Timm v. Dewsnup, which also does not apply in this case. 
Ironically, Plaintiffs have cited to a case that involves an appeal of a trial court's order 
disallowing amendment of a complaint—something which Plaintiffs have failed to do altogether 
and which is not even an issue in this summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs failed to provide the 
entire quote from the court in Timm. This remainder of the quote reads as follows: 
The pleadings are never more important than the case that is before the court. . . . 
There can be no prejudice in this case because we'll give ample time for an 
answer. . . . This is in harmony with what we regard as the correct policy: of 
recognizing the desirability of the pleadings setting forth definitely framed issues, 
but also of permitting amendment where the interest of justice so requires, and the 
adverse party is given a fair opportunity to meet it. 
851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs have not even requested leave to 
amend their complaint, and yet urge this Court to provide the same relief given to a party that 
had properly and timely requested leave to amend. 
In Wright v. Umv of Utah, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed a similar claim for relief 
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from a party who failed even to request leave to amend a complaint. The plaintiff in Wright filed 
a complaint against a University of Utah employee, claiming he had "assaulted and struck" her. 
876 P.2d 380, 381-82 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Later, plaintiff attempted to claim that the "assault" 
may have been unintentional.1 Id. at 384. The plaintiff argued that her complaint should have 
been "broadly construed" to allow a reading that the terms "assaulted and struck" could 
encompass an unintentional act, "especially where the [defendant] was on notice from plaintiffs 
response to its motion for judgment on the pleadings that she was attempting to assert an 
unintentional hitting." Id. The court concluded that "[w]hile it is true that Utah has adopted 
liberal notice pleadings requirements . . . those requirements cannot be applied in a vacuum" 
Id. (emphasis added). The court went further: 
Wright claims that even if we determine that her complaint alleges an assault, we 
should nonetheless conclude that the trial court erred by failing to provide her the 
opportunity to amend her complaint to allege an unintentional hitting. This claim 
fails because Wright never attempted to amend her complaint, and instead stood 
by her allegations as originally pleaded even in the face of potential dismissal. 
Id. at 385 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have stood by their allegations and have refused to even 
acknowledge that their Complaint fails to raise SB 189 as a claim, "even in the face of potential 
dismissal." The cases cited by Plaintiffs fail to support their position of their compliance with 
Utah's notice pleading standard. Furthermore, Utah appellate courts have considered their 
arguments and have ruled against them on several occasions, including as recent as this year on 
two separate occasions. 
1
 It is important to note that even though the Wright case dealt with a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and the 
sufficiency standard was arguably more difficult to prove as evidenced by the Blackham case addressed above, the 
court still upheld dismissal of the claims and disallowed the plaintiff to pursue her unintentional tort claim 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should not consider any of Plaintiffs' arguments or claims related to SB 189 
in addressing Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Numerous Utah appellate court 
decisions prevent consideration of such unstated claims. Plaintiffs have relied on Utah's liberal 
pleading standard as the basis for defeating summary judgment, since they have already 
conceded that they cannot prevail in their claims as presently pled in their Complaint. Instead, 
Plaintiffs now request that this Court rule that their claims of Defendant's alleged breach of 
"Utah law" somehow satisfies their requirements under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Utah Supreme Court has unequivocally ruled otherwise. In addition, Plaintiffs' failure to timely 
and adequately request leave to amend their pleadings to conform to Utah's liberal pleading 
standard contradicts the very case it used to support their claim of compliance. Therefore, 
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion for Summary Judgment and 
refuse to consider Plaintiffs' claims related to SB 189, which they failed to raise in the 
Complaint that governs and limits the scope of their claims. 
DATED this O "~ day of December, 2008. 
RICHARD B$&NDT MILLER NELSON 
S. DA VIES 
BELINDA A. MORGAN 
RAPAEL A. SEMINARIO 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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